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We find that Chinese trade flows respond to economic activity and relative prices – as represented by
a trade weighted exchange rate – but the relationships are not always precisely or robustly estimated.
Chinese exports are generally well-behaved, rising with foreign GDP and decreasing as the Chinese
renminbi (RMB) appreciates. However, the estimated income elasticity is sensitive to the treatment
of time trends. Estimates of aggregate imports are more problematic. In many cases, Chinese aggregate
imports actually rise in response to a RMB depreciation and decline with Chinese GDP. This is true
even after accounting for the fact a substantial share of imports are subsequently incorporated into
Chinese exports. We find that some of these counter-intuitive results are mitigated when we disaggregate
the trade flows by customs type, commodity type, and the type of firm undertaking the transactions.
However, for imports, we only obtain more reasonable estimates of elasticities when we allow for
different import intensities for different components of aggregate demand (specifically, consumption
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China’s growing role in the world economy has sparked both envy and enmity. Her exporting 
prowess and ballooning trade surplus over the past decade have elicited charges of unfair 
competition. In some interpretations, China’s current account surplus has been identified as the 
cause of the global financial crisis of 2008 (e.g., CEA, 2009). An often heard proposed remedy is 
that China should adjust its exchange rate policy to alleviate global imbalances. Policymakers of 
several countries, including the US, openly urge China to allow the Chinese currency, the 
renminbi (RMB), to appreciate at a faster rate in order to reduce its large trade surplus. 
  China, on the other hand, has resisted that pressure and has asserted that the RMB 
undervaluation is not a (main) cause of the recent global finance crisis and furthermore 
accelerated currency appreciation would do little to reduce trade imbalances. Even though the 
RMB has been allowed to appreciate since 2005 and – after a hiatus – again since 2010, China 
has maintained a policy of relatively stable exchanges rates over the last few decades. 
  Would an appreciation of the Chinese currency have mitigated the effects of global 
imbalances and averted the crisis? The answer depends a lot on the behavior of China’s trade 
flows and whether these flows conform to the usual prescription that a more valuable currency 
implies a lower trade balance. Even when unattended by such concerns, there is a natural interest 
in the determinants of Chinese trade flows. This interest was only heightened when trade 
surpluses expanded in the mid-2000s, and once again as they rose again in the wake of the Great 
Recession. 
The Chinese trade phenomenon poses a number of distinct questions. The first is whether 
Chinese exports have behaved in a distinctly odd manner; have they risen in line with foreign 
economic activity as expected, or have they risen more rapidly than expected? How have 
exchange rate changes, which many policymakers in the West have pinned their hopes of 
expenditure switching on, affected Chinese exports in the past, and how are they expected to 
affect exports going forward? Even more challenging questions relate to Chinese imports. First, 
why don’t Chinese imports rise with GDP, as they would in an advanced economy? Second, why 
is it so difficult to find evidence that currency appreciation increases imports in China. In other 
words, why don’t the usual rules apply to China? 2 
 
Several hypotheses have been suggested in the literature. First, the large amount of 
processing trade obscures the usual effects; when a large share of the imported goods is used in 
exports, the usual activity variables, like GDP, might not be appropriate. In addition, exchange 
rates might have a muted effect if the share of domestic value added in Chinese exports is small. 
Second, with a rapidly changing economic structure and different import intensities, 
aggregate import elasticities might exhibit instability. A similar argument could be applied to a 
changing structure of trade; different types of trade might respond differently to exchange rates. 
Once again, stable aggregate elasticity estimates might be difficult to obtain in such instances. 
  While these conjectures are not new, we believe a new study is justified by the recent 
drop off and resumption in Chinese imports and exports. The additional variation gives us hope 
that one can obtain more precise estimates of the relevant trade elasticities. Armed with these 
estimates, policymakers will be able to better calibrate their policies.  
Looking backwards, this study can inform the question of whether policy could have 
mitigated the size of capital flows from China that fueled, according to some observers (CEA, 
2009), the excesses that led to the financial crisis of 2008. If Chinese trade flows don’t respond 
to exchange rate changes as normal flows do, then even a substantially appreciated RMB might 
not have resulted in smaller current account surpluses. 
Looking forward, these empirical challenges motivate our analysis of Chinese trade 
flows. We examine the aggregate trade flows that others have examined, but in addition to 
disaggregating along the lines other have, we check other means of classification, in order to 
identify divergent behaviors.  
To anticipate our results, we obtain several interesting findings. We find that Chinese 
multilateral trade flows do respond to relative prices – as represented by a trade weighted 
exchange rate – but that that relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the 
direction of effects is different than expected a priori. For instance, we find that Chinese ordinary 
imports rise in response to a RMB depreciation. However, Chinese exports do appear to respond 
to RMB depreciation in the expected manner, as long as a supply variable is included. So, in this 
sense, Chinese trade is not exceptional.  
  3 
 
2. Descriptive  Analysis 
 
Before embarking upon the formal data analysis, it’s useful to review some of the data. The trade 
balance, expressed in US dollars, is shown Figure 1. The Chinese RMB trade weighted real 
exchange rate is also included in the figure (An increase in the real rate implies a RMB 
appreciation). It is quite evidenced that the trade balance expands remarkably around 2003, and 
rises in absolute terms and as a share of GDP until the Great Recession. There is a remarkably 
steep drop off during the recession, and then a resumption of the trade surplus. Also, note that 
after 2003, the RMB real exchange rate moves together with China’s trade surplus. 
  Note over this period, there are a number of other important events, including the 
unification of separate exchange rates at the end of 1993, sharp declines in the import tariff rates 
starting in 1995, the East Asian crisis in 1997, and finally WTO accession in 2002.  
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the aggregate import and export flows. It’s clear that 
while both trade flows start growing rapidly in the 2000’s, exports start pulling away from 
imports in 2005.  
Figure 3 shows the breakdown between exports for processing and for ordinary trade; 
figure 4 presents the corresponding data for imports. This breakdown has often been used to 
account for the potentially different determinants of trade used for differing purposes. For 
exports, it is difficult to detect any noticeable breaks in the shares. However, for imports, there is 
a clear jump in the processing share in mid-1998; and in mid 2005, the processing share begins 
to rise steadily. The latter is notable in that it coincides with the widening in the trade balance. 
Figures 5 and 6 display exports and imports by commodity type – but only at a very 
coarse level, namely manufactured goods versus primary products. While the value of primary 
exports has inched up, the primary export share has experienced a long and gradual decline of 
the 15 year period. On the other hand, primary goods have accounted for an increasing share of 
imports, with a pronounced trend appearing in 2002. There is a temporary jump in 2008, likely 
due to rising oil prices.  
  Finally, Figures7 and 8 exhibit the trade activity breakdown by type of firm. For both 
exports and imports, as expected, the state owned enterprise share declines, albeit more markedly 
for exports. And as expected, private firms become more important over time, but more 
substantially so for exports. Finally Foreign invested enterprises, while accounting for similar 4 
 
shares by 2010, experienced much more of an increase in importance for exports. In other words, 
foreign owned enterprises have been particularly important in export growth.  
  With these observable changes in the magnitude and nature of Chinese trade, it would be 
unsurprising to find changes in the behavior of aggregate Chinese trade. Hence, studies based on 
earlier data, from the 1980’s and early 1990’s, would likely have little relevance for assessing the 
current responsiveness of Chinese trade to external and internal factors.  
 
3.  Trade Elasticities – Total Trade Data 
  
3.1  The Exchange Rate Effect 
Conventional wisdom holds that a trade surplus could be curbed by raising the value of 
the associated currency. However, standard economic analyses suggest that the exchange rate 
effect is more complicated than that laid out in the conventional wisdom.  For instance, consider 
the elasticity approach that illustrates real exchange rate effects on trade balance.  
Typically, the elasticities approach takes the exchange rate as exogenous to the trade 
flows. Then there are two effects emanating from an exchange rate change. One is the volume 
effect that captures the effect of revaluation on export and import volumes. Under normal 
circumstances, a revaluation discourages exports and promotes imports, and, thus, reduces trade 
surplus. The second effect is the value (price) effect, which measures the decrease in the 
domestic value of the initial import volume due to revaluation. A revaluation could reduce trade 
balance if the volume effect dominates the value effect, which is the Marshall-Lerner condition. 
When the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, a revaluation results a deterioration of the trade 
balance and devaluation improves it. 
The anecdotal evidence given in Figure 1, for example, suggests that the appreciation of 
the RMB may not lead to a reduction in China’s trade balance. That is, the Marshall-Lerner 
condition may not hold for the China case. To be fair, the Marshall-Lerner condition is typically 
derived under specific assumptions – including the implicit assumption that the output is 
constant, and import and export supply elasticities are constant are perfectly elastic (the latter 
equivalent to saying the resource allocation can adjust according to the change in the trade 
pattern).  Several of these assumptions are unlikely to hold for the Chinese economy in 
transition. 5 
 
In the case of the Chinese trade flows, there is some reason to believe that the 
conventional elasticities approach is insufficient. An oft cited characteristic of the Chinese 
economy is its position in the global production chain. Since China plays an important role at the 
final phrase of the international production process, its trade flows might not be responsive to 
exchange rate changes.
1 Given the high degree of production fragmentation, an appreciation 
raises the relative price of exports, but lowers the price of inputs. The appreciation thus only 
affects the value added component of Chinese exports, and the net effect of a RMB appreciation 
on global imbalances could be ambiguous. Devereux and Genberg (2007), for example, use an 
analytical model to illustrate that an RMB depreciation will have an immediate perverse effect 
and little short-run effect on the current account balance. 
 
3.2   Selected Chinese Trade Elasticity Estimates 
 
There is a paucity of formal statistical analyses analyzing Chinese trade.
2 Kwack et al. (2007) 
uses a gravity model augmented with a CPI deflated real exchange rate to estimate elasticities 
over the 1984 to 2003 period. Using a panel of 29 developed and developing countries, he 
obtains a Chinese multilateral import price elasticity of 0.50 and an income elasticity of 1.57.
3 
Thorbecke and Smith (2007) do not directly examine the implications for both imports 
and exports, but do focus on the impact of RMB appreciation on exports, taking into account the 
integration of the production chain in the region. Using a sample of 33 countries over the 1994-
2005 period, and a trade-weighted exchange rate that measures the impact of how bilateral 
exchange rates affect imported input prices, they find that a 10% RMB appreciation in the 
absence of changes in other East Asian currencies would result in a 3% decline in processed 
                                                       
1 For real exchange rate movements and intermediate product trade, see Parsley and Popper 
(2010). See Wang and Wei (2010) for relatively high Chinese value added shares in Chinese 
exports.  
2 We review only studies published in the past five years. A survey of earlier studies is in 
Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2010). 
3 Wang and Ji (2006) adopt a related approach, and find essentially zero effect of nominal 
exchange rates on Chinese imports and exports.  6 
 
exports and an 11% decline in ordinary exports. If other East Asian currencies appreciated in line 
with the RMB, then the resulting change in the processed exports would be 9%. 
Marquez and Schindler (2007) argue that the absence of useful price indices for Chinese 
imports and exports requires the adoption of an alternative model specification. They treat the 
variable of interest as world (import or export) trade shares, broken down into “ordinary” and 
“parts and components”. Using monthly Chinese imports data from 1997 to July 2006, they find 
ordinary trade-share income “elasticities” ranging from -0.021 to -0.001 (i.e., the coefficients are 
in the wrong direction), and price “elasticities” from 0.013 to 0.021.
4  The parts and components 
price elasticities are in the wrong direction, and statistically significantly so. Interestingly, the 
stock of FDI matters in almost all cases. Since the FDI stock is a smooth trend, it is not clear 
whether to attribute the effect explicitly to the effect of FDI, or to other variables that may be 
trending upward over time, including productive capacity. 
For export shares (ordinary goods), they find income elasticities ranging from 0.08 to 
0.09, and price elasticities ranging from 0.08 to 0.068. For parts and components export share, 
the income coefficient ranges from a 0.042 to 0.049. Their preferred specification implies that a 
ten-percent real appreciation of the Chinese RMB reduces the Chinese trade balance between 
$75 billion and $92 billion. 
Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2007) come close to our approach. They examine data over 
the 1995-2005 period, breaking the data into ordinary and processing/parts imports and exports. 
They relate Chinese exports to the world imports and the real effective exchange rate, augmented 
by a proxy measure for the value-added tax rebate on exports, and a capacity utilization variable. 
In both import and export equations, the stock of FDI is included. One notable result they obtain 
is that for Chinese imports, the real exchange rate coefficient has a sign opposite of anticipated in 
the full sample.  
One particularly interesting result they obtain is that post-WTO entry, Chinese income 
and price elasticities for exports rise considerably. On the import side, no such change is obvious 
with respect to the pre- and post-WTO period. 
                                                       
4 Marquez and Schindler (2007) conjecture that this counterintuitive result arises from the role of 
state owned enterprises. They also observe that this result can occur under certain configurations 
of substitutability between imported and domestic goods. 7 
 
In the bilateral vein, Mann and Plück (2007) investigate China-US trade. Using an error 
correction model specification applied to disaggregate bilateral data over the 1980-2004 period, 
they find extremely high income elasticities for US imports from China: for capital and 
consumer goods the estimated long run income elasticities are 10 and 4, respectively. The 
consumer good price elasticity is not statistically significant, while the capital good elasticity is 
implausibly high, around 10.
5 On the other hand, US exports to China have a relatively low 
income elasticity of 0.74 and 2.25 for capital and consumer goods, respectively.  The price 
elasticity estimates are not statistically significant. In general, they have difficulty obtaining 
sensible coefficient estimates. 
Thorbecke (2006) examines aggregate bilateral US-China data over the 1988-2005 
period. Using both the Johansen maximum likelihood method, as well as the Stock-Watson 
(1993) dynamic OLS methodology, he finds statistically significant evidence of cointegration 
between incomes, real exchange rates and CPI-deflated trade flows. 
US imports from China have a real exchange rate elasticity ranging from 0.4 to 1.28 
(depending upon the number of leads and lags in the DOLS specification). The income elasticity 
ranges between 0.26 to 4.98. In all instances, substitution with ASEAN trade flows is accounted 
for by the inclusion of an ASEAN/Dollar real exchange rate. Interestingly, the income elasticities 
are not statistically significant, even when quantitatively large. For US exports to China, he 
obtains exchange rate elasticities ranging from 0.42 to 2.04, and income elasticities ranging from 
1.05 to 1.21. 
  Ahmed (2009) examines a more recent period of Chinese data, and finds that Chinese 
exports respond fairly strongly to real exchange rate appreciation, at least when the relationship 
is estimated in first differences. The long run elasticity (in growth rates) is in excess of unity. On 
the other hand, they are unable to obtain sensible price elasticities for Chinese imports.  
  Finally, Aziz and Li (2008) document the tremendous compositional changes in Chinese 
trade flows in order to rationalize the use of disaggregate data. They find aggregate trade 
elasticities are varying over time due to both compositional shifts in types of goods, and variation 
in individual category elasticities.  
                                                       
5 Mann and Plück (2007) use disaggregate US trade flow and price index data from BEA. The 
reported income elasticities are for matched expenditure series, e.g., investment activity as the 
income variable in a regression involving capital goods. 8 
 
Their specifications involve activity variables, and relative productivity variables, and use 
dynamic OLS. Unlike our study, they rely upon prices of exports and imports as their price 
variable; that is they do not incorporate exchange rate changes, but take the prices of exports and 
imports as exogenously given.
6 
 
3.3   Estimation 
  First, let us consider Chinese trade flows with respect to the rest-of-the-world. We 
estimate the following equations, where the designations import and export are from the Chinese 
perspective, 
*
01 2 3 1 , tt t t t ex y r z u       ,      ( 1 )  
and 
01 2 3 2 , tt t t t im y r w u       ,      ( 2 )  
 
where y is an activity variable, r is the real value of the RMB, and z is a supply side variable. The 
variable w is a shift variable accounting for other factors that might increase import demand. 
Seasonal dummies are included. The empirical counterparts to these variables are described in 
Appendix 1. 
Most of the variables in these specifications appear to be integrated of order one (see 
Appendix 2). Hence, the equations are estimated using the Stock-Watson (1993) dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) regression method, which is a single equation approach that yields a consistent and 
efficient OLS estimator of the cointegration relationship.
 7 An interpretation of the reported 
estimates is that they represent the empirical long-run interactions between these variables. Thus, 
theoretical reasoning, rather the regression specification, is used to infer the causal links between 
                                                       
6 Aziz and Li (2008) also examine differential behavior along customs classification, as we do, 
but do not pursue the differentiation along firm types. They also allow for productivity trends 
and evolving product sophistication in some of their regression specifications. 
7 While there are a number of methods for estimating the cointegrating relationships, we use this 
DOLS approach because it has been shown to be outperform other approaches such as error 
correction models, particularly in small samples (e.g., Inder (1993), Mantalvo (1995), Phillips 
and Hansen (1990)). Given the small sample, we also eschew the Johansen maximum likelihood 
multivariate approach. 9 
 
these variables. For instance, it is conventionally assumed that the real exchange rate variable 
causes the trade volume variables. Also, because of China’s role in the global supply chain, it is 
assumed that a fraction of imports is intermediate goods and its demand is driven by export 
activity. 
In general, the estimated residuals obtained from the specification that has one lead and 
lag of first differences of the right hand side variables are quite well behaved. Stock and Watson 
suggest the inclusion of time trends.  
For the dependent variables, we have collected data on Chinese exports and imports from 
as early as 1993, to 2010, on a monthly basis, which are then aggregated to the quarterly 
frequency. Note that we examine both aggregate and disaggregate trade flows. Disaggregation 
mitigates potential biases due to inappropriate aggregation, as noted by Berman et al. 
(forthcoming), and Dekle et al. (2011), among others. 
One particularly difficult issue involves price deflators to use to convert nominal 
magnitudes into real.  Until 2005, the Chinese did not report price indices for imports and 
exports; this limits the sample to one far too short to use in the analysis. Hence, we rely upon a 
variety of proxy measures, each with some drawbacks. Since the trade flows are reported in US 
dollars, the price measures we consider include the US PPI for finished goods, price indices from 
the World Bank
8, and Hong Kong re-export unit value indices. We only report results based 
upon the last deflator; the remaining results are qualitatively similar to those reported, and are 
available upon request.  
Hong Kong is the most important entrepot for China trade. Given the paucity of the 
Chinese trade indexes, the Hong Kong unit value indices have typically been used in empirical 
analyses as proxy measures for Chinese trade (Cheung, 2005). In Cheung et al. (2010), the Hong 
Kong to China re-export unit value indices are used to deflate Chinese imports and the Hong 
Kong to US re-export unit value indices to deflate Chinese exports.  
  Our measure of the real RMB exchange rate is the IMF’s CPI deflated trade-weighted 
index of the RMB against a broad basket of currencies. The results do not differ if one uses the 
BIS trade weighted index.  
                                                       
8 Since the World Bank price indices are only available at the annual frequency, we interpolate 
the data to obtain quarterly values. 10 
 
As one can see in Figure 1, before 1994, the trade weighted real value of the RMB based 
on official exchange rates was highly appreciated, and experiences a large discrete downward 
move in 1994M01. Some observers have characterized this as a massive devaluation; however, 
as Fernald, Edison and Loungani (1999) observe, many transactions were taking at “swap” rates, 
so that the relevant exchange rate was probably much weaker than the official rate. In order to 
circumvent difficulties in identifying the “correct” exchange rate value, we truncate the sample 
so as avoid pre-1994 exchange rate data. This means the regressions usually incorporate trade 
data starting in 1994Q3, in order to account for lags.  
The IMF and BIS trade weighted indices are CPI deflated; while the CPI deflated real 
rate is a commonly used indicator of currency strength, in some ways one would want something 
more closely linked to firm competitiveness in the macroeconomic context, such as the PPI 
deflated or unit labor cost deflated real value of the RMB (see Chinn, 2006). Unfortunately, we 
don’t have access to such measures for China.  
For y*, we use export-weighted real GDP in the rest-of-the-world, while y is measured 
using real GDP expressed in real RMB. For z, we rely upon several proxy variables, including 
the stock of fixed asset investment, and relative productivity. 
 
3.4   Results 
Table 1 presents the results for aggregate exports; the real value of the Chinese RMB is 
expressed so that an increase represents an appreciation. Hence, our expectation is that GDP 
should enter in with positive coefficient and the exchange rate with negative. In column 1, we 
find that indeed the exchange rate enters with a strongly and significantly negative coefficient, 
thus confirming the sensitivity of Chinese exports to exchange rate changes.  
In addition, rest-of-world economic activity registers strongly positive, with a coefficient 
of around 1.4. This is true even though we have augmented the specification with a linear time 
trend. Had we omitted the trend, the coefficient on foreign output would have been around 2.2. 
In some sense, when we think of the tremendous growth in Chinese exports, only a small amount 
is being driven by the measured correlation with the world’s income, and the rest is a trend 
increase in the Chinese exports, perhaps due to China increasing share of world exports, as well 
as the increasing export intensity of the world economy. That trend works out to a secular 16% 
annual growth over the sample period. 11 
 
Our basic result is not sensitive to the inclusion of some obvious stationary covariates, 
including for instance the growth rate of credit. Typically, one thinks of credit as driving 
domestic demand, but we consider the possibility that the access to credit decreases the cost of 
acquiring working capital (column 3). While the coefficient is positive, it is not statistically 
significant.  
  Finally, we consider the role of structural breaks in the export relationship. Although we 
have conducted a number of univariate structural break tests, the results are inconclusive, and 
often point to differing dates, although many of them are around China’s accession to the WTO. 
On a priori grounds, as well as suggestive statistical test results, we augment the regression with 
a dummy variable for WTO accession, and allow for a differential trend in the post-WTO 
period.
9  
  The results are reported in Column 3. These results are interesting in that they indicate 
that the overall time trend was proxying for a trend in the post-WTO period. The income 
coefficient is now substantially higher.
10  
  We now turn to imports. We initially estimated the import relationship over the same 
sample that we used for exports. However, a consistent finding when using this sample was a 
statistically significant and negative sign on the real exchange rate, contrary to expectations. That 
is, over the entire sample it appears that a stronger RMB causes less, not more, imports. Hence, 
we take seriously the structural break identified in our univariate tests, and truncate the sample to 
begin in the post WTO accession period. We report the results for aggregate imports in Table 2. 
In the basic specification (column 1), increases in Chinese GDP are associated with an increase 
in imports, with a particularly high elasticity of 3.2. In addition, an appreciated Chinese RMB 
induces a decrease in imports.  
  There has been much discussion of how much of Chinese imports are used as inputs for 
export. That is, China is one link in the integrated supply chain. Assuming Chinese imports are 
driven solely by demand by domestic Chinese households and firms would then be a mistake. 
                                                       
9 The WTO accession dummy is set to equal 1 at 2002Q1 and thereafter. 
10 We also estimated regressions where our proxy for supply – namely the stock of capital – is 
included; these were not particularly successful, so we do not report the results. 12 
 
One way to account for this aspect of the Chinese economy is to include exports as an 
independent variable.
11  
  The results of this specification are reported in column 2. Exports enter in with the 
expected sign (and a near unit elasticity). The perverse coefficient on income is statistically 
significant, and the time trend now becomes statistically significant. We suspect this finding is 
due to the multicollinearity between GDP and the trend. However, we do obtain a positive and 
statistically and economically significant coefficient on the real exchange rate.  
  To sum up, on the export side, we have results that are basically in accord with 
conventional theory. On the import side, we have some quite surprising and difficult to explain 
results, unless we restrict the analysis to the post-WTO accession period. In addition, even the 
results for this truncated sample are sensitive to the treatment of trends. There are two ways to 
proceed. We can search out for additional variables that might eliminate these surprising results. 
Alternatively, we can disaggregate the data, in the hopes that analyses of individual trade 
categories will overturn the perverse results on the import side. And, on the export side, 
disaggregation might yield new insights. 
 
4.  Processing versus ordinary exports and imports 
The Chinese customs agency categories exports and imports into those goods that are to be used 
for processing purposes, and those to be used as ordinary exports or imports. For instance, 
processing imports are usually for manufacturing finished products in China for (re-)exporting 
and these imports are usually subjected to more favorable tariff rates. In contrast, processing 
exports are exports that are used by the imported country for processing and assembly. 
We first examine the behavior of exports in Table 3. Ordinary export results are on the 
left hand side, while processing export results are on the right hand side. The common result is 
that for both types of exports, the value of the RMB enters in with the right sign and statistical 
significance. One large difference is the fact that ordinary exports do not exhibit a statistically 
significant sensitivity to rest-of-world GDP (unless a post-WTO trend is included, as in column 
3). In contrast, processing exports always exhibit income elasticities in excess of unity. 
                                                       
11 It could be argued that we should use processing exports instead of total exports. Substituting 
one for the other does not lead to any consequential changes in the results. We conjecture that 
this is the case because the two series share the same trajectory. See Figure 3. 13 
 
Next, we investigate whether the corresponding disaggregation yields some more 
promising results for imports (see Table 4). The simple answer is mixed. For ordinary imports, 
the income elasticity is positive but not statistically significant, while the exchange rate has the 
wrong effect. If one includes exports (which is not well motivated for ordinary imports), the 
results are largely negative as well, since no economic variable enters with significance. 
For processing imports, both income and the real exchange rate enter significantly, but 
the latter enters with the wrong sign. Including exports results in properly signed coefficients for 
the exchange rate and export variables. Income now enters with a negative, and significant, sign. 
This result signals the collinearity of many of the variables.  
 
5.  Manufactures versus Primary Products 
The next disaggregation we examine is between primary and manufactured goods.
12 On 
the export side, primary products have slowly trended to a smaller share, now less than 10% of 
total exports. On the other hand, the primary share of imports has exhibited more substantial 
movements as China has become a much more substantial importer of commodities, particularly 
of oil. The latter has experienced large swings in price over the last few years, inducing an 
upward spike in the primary product share in 2008. 
In interpreting Table 5, it is useful to recall that in the sample period almost all exports 
are manufactured. Primary products exhibit a negative income elasticity, unless a post-WTO 
accession trend is included. Then, China is exporting more commodities over time, with an 
income elasticity of about unity; the time trend implies about 5.6% secular increase per annum. 
Moreover, such exports respond to the exchange rate.  
  Manufactured goods exports behave pretty much in the same fashion as aggregate 
exports. That outcome makes sense since they account for most exports, and even at the 
beginning of the sample didn’t account for less than 20% of total. If one takes column 6 
estimates to be the most reliable, then the income elasticity of manufactured exports is 5.9, and 
they respond to price changes with an elasticity of about 0.9. Even with the high income 
                                                       
12 The classification follows the one-digit level convention of the Standard International Trade 
Classification, Rev.3. Specifically, the “primary” includes the level 0 to level 4 and the 
“manufactures” level 5 to level 9. 14 
 
elasticity, Chinese manufactured exports exhibit a secular trend growth of about 10% per annum 
(a bit less than double that for primary product exports). 
  On the import side (Table 6), we obtain mixed results. Under specifications (1) and (3), 
primary imports do not appear to respond to Chinese income in a statistically significant fashion 
while the manufacturing imports do. It appears to be important to include exports in the 
specification. Then, they appear to be important drivers of imports, and the exchange rate 
coefficient no longer exhibits a significant and incorrect sign. 
 
6.  The Changing Ownership Structure 
To say the structure of the Chinese economy has changed drastically over the past twenty years 
is an understatement. One of the dimensions in which that change has taken place is in terms of 
ownership. At the beginning of the 1990’s, state owned enterprises retained a commanding role 
in the economy. By the end of the sample, in 2010, private firms had taken on a much bigger 
role. 
Figures 9 and 10 highlight the relative roles of state owned enterprises (SOEs), foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs), and private firms in exports and imports. The rise of the role of 
foreign invested enterprises and even more so private firms in exports – all at the expense of 
SOEs – is remarkable.  
The results of estimating separate equations for different types of exports depending on 
sourcing are reported in Table 7. When we disaggregate to this level, we note that all the 
coefficient estimates are correctly signed. With the exception of specification (9), SOE exports 
exhibit the lowest income elasticity, while FIEs the next highest, and private firms the very 
highest.  
Another general pattern is that the price elasticities rise as one goes from SOEs to FIEs, 
to private firms. We find this pattern of interest since it accords with the view that SOEs are the 
least concerned with profit maximization, FIEs are likely to be somewhat insensitive to exchange 
rate and cost fluctuations as they are conducting long term intra firm transactions. Finally, in this 




13 Of course, not all else is held constant. In particular, one would expect the industrial structure 
and distribution across product types to differ across ownership segments.  15 
 
The results are otherwise somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of post-WTO accession 
trends. In particular, the price effect is smaller (in magnitude) and displays a lower level of 
significance in the presence of these WTO dummy variables. Interestingly, the exchange rate 
elasticity for private firms remains significant (and quite strong) in all cases. The robustness of 
the price elasticity is consistent with the argument that many private firms are operating with 
very thin margins, so that small exchange rate appreciations can induce relatively large losses. 
The corresponding results for imports are less promising (Table 8). The estimated income 
elasticity is positive, unless the exports variable is included. The exchange rate coefficient has 
the wrong sign, and is correctly signed only for SOEs and FIEs when exports are included.   
For both SOEs and FIEs, exports show up as particularly important. The elasticity of 
imports with respect to exports is least marked for private enterprises.    
 
7. Other  Factors 
7.1  Sex Ratios, Nominal Exchange Rates and Regimes 
  Given the difficulty in modeling Chinese trade flows, we investigate the importance of 
including additional control variables. In this subsection, we discuss the marginal effect of the 
control variables including the sex-ratio, the nominal exchange rate, and the commodity price. 
To conserve space, we present these results in the Appendix. 
One factor is suggested by the work of Du and Wei (2010). They employ an OLG model 
to illustrate the importance of the sex-ratio in determining the Chinese current account balance.  
In general, the inclusion of the sex-ratio variable does not qualitatively alter the sign and 
significance of the other variables. These results are reported in Tables 3A and A4 in the 
Appendix summarizes the sex-ratio effect on China’s exports and imports.
14 Moreover, this 
variable has a significant positive effect on exports but negative – albeit insignificant -- impact 
on imports. The findings are in accord with the finding that the sex ratio imbalance is associated 
with trade surplus.  
We also examine the proposition that the nominal exchange rate would be a better 
indicator of relative prices. One rationale for this is that the rigidity of the nominal exchange rate 
                                                       
14 The annual data were interpolated using the quarterly saving rate data and a time trend to 
obtain the quarterly sex-ratio data from 1995Q1 – 2010Q4. We investigated whether the results 
were due to seasonality; the results were unchanged when we used de-seasonalized data. 16 
 
conveys information not incorporated into the behavior of the real exchange rate. As reported in 
Appendix Tables A5 and A6, an RMB appreciation induces the expected effect only in the 
export specifications for FIEs and private firms, and an unexpected sign in the SOE export 
equation. The coefficient on the nominal rate is not significant in other export equations and the 
import equations. 
Given the fact that the Chinese exchange rate is de facto fixed for much of the sample 
period, we attempt to capture this fixity by inclusion of a dummy variable, which takes a value of 
unity starting from the second quarter of 2005. The estimated price elasticity does not change 
with this new specification (see Appendix Tables A7 and A8). Hence, these results do not lend a 
strong support for this specific policy effect. 
Finally, given that commodity imports become important toward the latter part of the 
period, we include a commodity terms of trade variable. Aside from the contrasting effects 
recorded for the SOE and FIE export equations, the commodity terms of trade variable does not 
have a statistically significant effect on other specifications in Appendix Tables A9 and A10. 
Hence, despite the apparent importance of commodities, the terms of trade do not appear to be a 
substantial factor affecting China’s trade.  
Summing up, the results in Tables A3 to A10 suggest that while the inclusion of these 
additional control variables might have implications for selected trade equations, there is no 
discernible evidence of a pattern of improved results. Nor does the inclusion of these variables 
improve the goodness of fit. The root-mean-squared-errors (RMSEs) in Tables A3 to A10 are no 
larger than the corresponding ones in Tables 1 to 8. Hence, we now move to examining an 
alternative strategy aimed at the import equations in the next subsection. 
 
7.2 Differential  Import-Intensities of Aggregate Demand 
As we noted earlier, there are other ways in which to attempt to obtain more plausible estimates, 
particularly with respect to imports. In addition to disaggregation, one can see if different types 
of imports respond differently to different components of aggregate demand. This approach 
follows Chinn (2010) and more recently Bussiere et al. (2011). The idea is that consumption 
might be relatively intensive in one type of import, while investment might be intensive in 
manufactured goods. Aggregate imports’ relationship to aggregate activity might appear to 
change as the composition of the economy varies. 17 
 
The results are reported in Table 9, for regressions over the entire sample (not just the 
post-WTO accession sample). The same specification, incorporating consumption and fixed asset 
investment as activity variables is estimated, along with exports, the real exchange rate and 
dummies and trends.  
In column 1, the regression results for aggregate imports are reported to establish a 
baseline. Interestingly, in this specification, both activity variables enter with the appropriate 
sign. At the same time, the post-WTO accession trend variable drops in significance. 
When we decompose imports by type of product, we find that primary imports appear to 
respond strongly to fixed asset investment, but negatively to consumption. They also depend on 
exports. Manufactured goods, on the other hand, do not appear to depend on any activity 
variable.  
For ordinary and processing goods, we find including fixed asset investment proves 
useful. Positive elasticities are recovered in both cases. In addition, processing imports depend 
positively on exports, while ordinary imports do not. This differential result makes a lot of sense.  
Finally, when stratifying the imports by firm type, we find once again including fixed 
asset investment is useful. We obtain the correct sign in all three instances. Exports enter 
positively as well.  
We obtain one particularly interesting result, relating to the exchange rate elasticity. In 
the aggregate, the estimated exchange rate coefficient is wrong-signed. It becomes correctly 
signed and statistically significant for primary imports and for imports of private firms. In the 
other instances, the coefficient is not statistically significant. One puzzle remains, however: 
manufactured imports continue to exhibit the wrong sign.  
Finally, we include relative productivity as an additional regressor, following Aziz and Li 
(2008). The motivation is that the CPI deflated real exchange rate does not fully reflect the price 
of Chinese tradable output, as it includes a large nontradable components (Chinn, 2006). The 
proxy variable is Chinese GDP per capita relative to US output per man hour in the nonfarm 
business sector. We present the results of these augmented regressions over the post-WTO-
accession sample in Table 10.  
The inclusion of the relative productivity variable yields substantially improved results. 
The exchange rate now has the correct sign for all aggregates and components of imports, and is 
statistically significant in most cases but one. Higher Chinese relative productivity decreases 18 
 
imports as well, which makes sense, as higher productivity is consistent with greater 
competitiveness. In some sense, the competitiveness variable explains even more of Chinese 
import behavior than the conventional variables, as the associated coefficient is significant in all 
cases but one. 
 
8. Concluding  remarks 
We have found that for exports, while there is some diversity of responses to income and 
exchange rate variables, Chinese trade flow behavior largely accords with conventional wisdom: 
Higher rest of world income results in higher Chinese exports, while a stronger RMB results in 
lower exports. However, the income elasticity is imprecisely estimated, varying widely 
depending upon the inclusion or exclusion of a linear time trend. In addition, the price elasticity 
varies widely between goods exported from SOEs, foreign invested firms, and private firms. The 
latter appear to behave in a more price-sensitive fashion than the other firm types. As their share 
of exports continues to rise, one should expect the overall price elasticity to increase, holding all 
else constant. 
On the import side, we obtain a more nuanced story, as we have replicated some of the 
puzzling results that other researchers have found, namely an apparently negative income 
elasticity. We are tempted to ascribe this result to import substitution taking place as the Chinese 
economy’s structure alters drastically. However, that remains a conjecture. 
On the other hand, the fact that disaggregation and the use of proxies for sectoral 
demands leads to positive coefficients on the activity variables is consistent with the view that 
rapid structural change has resulted in what appears to be unstable and perverse income and price 
elasticities at the aggregate level.  
Disaggregation improves the overall results, but leaves some anomalies in place. In 
particular, we are unable obtain a specification without a large negative price coefficient for 
manufactured imports, which still constitute about 70% of Chinese imports, except when relative 
productivity is included. Indeed, inclusion of relative productivity makes the estimates much 
more plausible, and results in a correctly-signed exchange rate coefficient. To the extent that 
relative productivity is correlated with supply, this outcome is not entirely surprising. 
Overall, Chinese trade flows do seem to respond to economic activity and price variables 
in the expected manner, at least when the data are sufficiently disaggregated or supply factors 19 
 
incorporated. Does it mean that policymakers in principle had the means by which they could 
have affected the trade balance in the run-up to the crisis, had they wished? Given the empirical 
results presented here, the answer is in the eye of the beholder. Our results suggest that China’s 
trade surplus could be reduced by appreciating the RMB, holding all else constant. To the extent 
real and financial imbalances – both within and without China – are exacerbated by these large 
Chinese surpluses and the consequent accumulation of reserves, this is an important finding. 
There is a less optimistic interpretation, however. We have assumed the exchange rate is 
exogenous in identifying the parameters, including the price elasticities. It might be that when 
policy authorities change the exchange rate, other macro variables might be affected in a way 
that offsets the effects laid out in the traditional elasticities approach. And overarching these 
points is the practical observation that our estimates are often imprecise and – in the case of 
income elasticities – sensitive to the treatment of trends. 
To further our understanding on the role of exchange rate policy in China’s trade 
imbalance, future work should investigate whether further disaggregation can yield greater 
insights into Chinese trade behavior. In particular, we can examine commodity types more 
finely. In addition, alternative proxies for Chinese supply might yield more precise estimates of 
the price and income variables. 
  20 
 
Appendix 1: Data – Definition and Source 
Import  China’s imports in US dollar normalized by the Hong Kong re-export to China unit 
value index. The data are in logarithm values. The types of import data considered are 
China’s total imports, imports of ordinary trade, imports of processing trade, primary 
goods imports, manufactured goods imports, and imports by SOEs, FIEs, and private 
firms. (Data Source: CEIC) 
Exports  China’s exports in US dollar normalized by the Hong Kong re-export to the 
world unit value index. The data are in logarithm values. The types of export data 
considered are China’s total exports, exports of ordinary trade, exports of processing 
trade, primary goods exports, manufactured goods exports, and exports by SOEs, FIEs, 
and private firms. (Data Source: CEIC) 
GDP  The income is given by the real GDP index of the rest of the world in the 
exports equation (Data source: Shaghil Ahmed at the Federal Reserve Board) 
and by China’s real GDP in RMB in the imports equation (Data source: CEIC). 
Both are in logarithm values.   
REER  The real effective exchange rate of the Chinese currency, the renminbi. (Data 
source: IMF IFS) 
CRgrw  China’s domestic credit growth rate. (Data source: CEIC) 
Consumption  China’s private consumption to GDP ratio. (Data source: CEIC) 
Fixed asset inv.  China’s fixed asset investment to GDP ratio. (Data source: CEIC) 
Prod  China’s relative productivity, measured by the Chinese GDP per capita relative 
to the US output per man hour in the nonfarm business sector. (Data source: 
CEIC and St. Louis Fed FRED) 
SexRatio  China’s sex ratio - the birth ratio of boy and girl, lagged for 20 years; 
interpolated from Wei and Zhang (2011). 
NER  The RMB nominal exchange rate, period average. (Data source: IMF IFS) 
CTOT  China's commodity terms of trade, measured as the ratio of weighted real 
commodity export price to weighted real commodity import price. The data are 
compiled according to the methodology of Spatafora and Tytell (2009). 
Reform  China’s exchange rate reform in July, 2005 dummy variable[ Reform = 1 
(t>2005Q3)] 
WTO  The China’s accession to WTO dummy variable [ WTO = 1 (t>2001Q4)] 
gfc08  The 2008 Great Recession dummy variable [gf08 = 1 (t = 08Q4, 09Q1, 09Q2)] 
Q1,Q2,Q3  The quarter dummy variables  
Trend  The time trend variable 
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DF-GLS with a trend  ADF test with one structural 
break in both mean and trend 
tau-statistics  lags  t-statistics  break point 
Aggregated exports  -1.672  5 -2.053    2003q3 
Primary goods exports  -3.230**  4  -2.422  2003q4 
Manufacture goods exports  -1.612  5  -2.004  2003q3 
Ordinary exports  -1.785  5 -2.183   2003q3 
Processing exports  -1.304  5 -1.975  2002q3 
SOE exports  -1.939  5 -2.268    2002q4 
FIE exports  -0.94  5  -2.033  2002q3 
Private firms exports  -1.908  4 -1.944   2004q1 
           
Aggregated imports  -1.665  5 -1.891   2002q3 
Primary goods imports  -3.102  1  -3.221  2003q2 
Manufacture goods imports  -2.273  4  -1.871  2002q3 
Ordinary imports  -2.782  4 -2.216   2001q3 
Processing imports  -1.543  5 -2.531  2002q3 
SOE imports  -1.683  6 -3.026   2001q3 
FIE imports  -1.254  5 -2.031   2002q4 
Private firms imports  -1.572  3 -1.844   2001q4 
              
China's real GDP  -1.991  4 -1.767   2003q4 
China's private consumption   -2.862  4  -2.45  2002q1 
China's fixed asset investment  -0.783  4 -1.725   2004q3 
The world real GDP  -1.908  2  -2.320   2004q1 
REER IMF  -1.46  1 -2.74    2007q2 
China's domestic credit growth rate  -5.764***  1  -6.599***  no break 
Note:  Export data are normalized by the Hong Kong re-export unit value index. Import data are 
normalized by the Hong Kong re-export to China unit value index. The normalized series in 
logarithms are used. The finite sample critical value at the 5% significant level for the DF-GLS 
test and the ADF test with one structural break are from Cheung and Lai (1995) and Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992), respectively. The break points are endogenously identified via grid search. 22 
 
Table A2: Cointegration test results with one known break point (2001Q4) 
Vector  H0 
Test Statistics 
Max Trace
Aggregated Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 44.36** 50.13**
r <= 1 5.34 5.76
Primary Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 39.78** 44.91**
r <= 1 4.62 5.12
Manufacture Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 44.09** 50.64**
r <= 1 6.13 6.54
Ordinary Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 47.60** 52.28**
r <= 1 4.06 4.68
Processing Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 37.52** 48.57**
r <= 1 10.89 11.04
SOE Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 29.55** 39.62**
r <= 1 9.35 10.07
FIE Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 31.17** 38.83**
r <= 1 7.49 7.65
Private Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 49.53** 55.72**
r <= 1 5.57 6.18
Aggregated Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 61.37** 86.88**
r <= 1 22.99** 25.51**
r <= 2 2.51 2.51
Primary Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 41.96** 68.55**
r <= 1 24.26** 26.58**
r <= 2 2.32 2.32
Manufacture Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 62.43** 87.22**
r <= 1 21.52** 24.79
r <= 2 3.26 3.26
Ordinary Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 40.02** 67.31**
r <= 1 24.65** 27.28**
r <= 2 2.63 2.63
Processing Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 36.54** 62.34**
r <= 1 21.59** 25.80**
r <= 2 4.21 4.21
SOE Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 28.02** 53.29**
r <= 1 23.39** 25.27
r <= 2 1.87 1.87
FIE Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 38.27** 59.34**
r <= 1 18.97** 21.0623 
 
r <= 2 2.09 2.09
Private Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 29.11** 50.85**
r <= 1 19.86** 21.74
r <= 2 1.87 1.87
Aggregated Import, Aggregated Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 68.58** 114.63**
r <= 1 28.43** 46.05**
r <= 2 17.29 17.61
Primary Import, Primary Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 50.98** 109.96**
r <= 1 37.80** 58.97**
r <= 2 20.38** 21.16
r <= 3 0.78 0.78
Manufacture Import, Manufacture Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 77.10** 119.24**
r <= 1 24.96** 42.13**
r <= 2 16.78 17.16
Ordinary Import, Ordinary Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 55.22** 101.69**
r <= 1 35.29** 46.47**
r <= 2 9.77 11.18
Processing Import, Processing Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 91.55** 130.42**
r <= 1 19.88*8 38.86**
r <= 2 18.79 18.98
SOE Import, SOE Import, GDP, REER  r = 0 30.03** 66.07**
r <= 1 24.01 40.03
FIE Import, FIE Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 72.21** 104.67**
r <= 1 19.46 32.45
Private Import, Private Export, GDP, REER  r = 0 49.75** 81.54**
r <= 1 27.79 31.79
Aggregated Import, Aggregated Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 61.02** 125.66**
r <= 1 40.33** 64.63**
r <= 2 17.44 24.3
Primary Import, Primary Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 55.04** 142.34**
r <= 1 48.85** 87.29**
r <= 2 30.95** 38.44
r <= 3 6.92 7.48
Manufacture Import, Manufacture Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 62.67** 121.87**
r <= 1 34.54** 59.20**
r <= 2 18.72 24.66
Ordinary Import, Ordinary Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 75.08** 128.17**
r <= 1 38.96** 53.0924 
 
r <= 2 9.44 14.12
Processing Import, Processing Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 93.83** 177.51**
r <= 1 51.99** 83.67**
r <= 2 24.61 31.68
SOE Import, SOE Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 39.99** 90.51**
r <= 1 31.18* 50.51
r <= 2 11.8 19.33
FIE Import, FIE Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 78.62** 135.86**
r <= 1 38.55** 57.24**
r <= 2 13.61 18.69
Private Import, Private Export, Consumption, FAI, REER  r = 0 71.64** 118.42**
r <= 1 32.62** 46.78
r <= 2 8.22 14.15
 Note: Results of the Johansen cointegration rank test with one known structural break point are 




Appendix 3: Regression Results Discussed in Section 7.1 
 
Table A3: China’s exports, normalized by the Hong Kong re‐export unit value index, controlling for China’s sex ratio effect 
   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary  Proc.  Primary  Manuf.  SOE  FIE  Priv. 
GDP  5.068***  4.912***  5.748***  1.075  5.336***  3.832***  6.318***  2.532 
   (0.41)  (0.68)  (0.62)  (0.70)  (0.41)  (0.72)  (0.70)  (1.59) 
REER  -0.954***  -1.273***  -0.787***  -0.758***  -0.967***  -0.541**  -0.660***  -5.771*** 
   (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.60) 
CRgrw  -0.100  0.038  -0.175  0.088  -0.157  0.073  -0.119  -0.720 
   (0.37)  (0.53)  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.42)  (0.48)  (0.37)  (1.03) 
SexRatio  0.131***  0.009  0.230***  0.122***  0.136***  -0.005  0.301***  -0.077 
   (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.10) 
WTO  -0.594***  -0.756***  -0.442***  -0.279**  -0.581***  -0.204*  -0.180**  1.671*** 
   (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.27) 
WTO*Trend  0.022***  0.027***  0.016***  0.011***  0.021***  0.008**  0.009***  -0.028*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Trend  -0.008*  -0.001  -0.017***  0.004  -0.007  -0.010  -0.011*  0.139*** 
   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Q1  -0.152***  -0.167***  -0.134***  -0.172***  -0.147***  -0.180***  -0.102***  -0.122* 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Q2  -0.042**  -0.016  -0.059**  -0.077***  -0.038*  -0.034  -0.039  -0.013 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Q3  0.009  0.017  0.008  -0.094***  0.020  0.020  0.007  0.084 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
Constant  0.633  14.128  -11.320***  -1.093  -0.071  12.866  -19.944***  37.655*** 
   (4.64)  (8.79)  (3.71)  (5.08)  (4.88)  (7.84)  (5.29)  (10.39) 
                          
RMSE  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.17 
Obs.  62  62  62  62  62  62  62  62 
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1   1, 2   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1  
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the aggregate and disaggregated export data. The pair of numbers given in the row 
labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  
Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, **, *” indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 26 
 
Table A4: China’s imports, normalized by the Hong Kong re‐export to China unit value index, controlling for China’s sex ratio effect 
   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  -4.208  -1.010 -2.586* -11.097*** -2.292 -5.259* -3.917* 4.160
   (2.75)  (3.42) (1.30) (2.77) (2.46) (2.95) (1.86) (2.93)
REER  0.525  -1.916 1.659*** -0.654 -0.273 0.580 1.041 8.021***
   (1.11)  (1.32) (0.52) (0.71) (0.94) (0.74) (0.76) (2.15)
Export  0.774  -0.885 1.649*** -0.179 0.589 0.429 1.304*** 2.418***
   (0.61)  (0.66) (0.30) (0.61) (0.52) (0.49) (0.42) (0.41)
SexRatio  -0.169  -0.445 0.021 -0.408 -0.152 -0.239 -0.231 0.161
   (0.25)  (0.29) (0.11) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.34)
WTO  -0.664  -0.853 -0.425 -0.999 -0.618 -1.268 -0.919* -4.065**
   (0.65)  (0.97) (0.36) (0.68) (0.52) (0.74) (0.52) (1.37)
WTO*Trend  0.017  0.013 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.032 0.031 0.156***
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Trend  0.122*  0.158* 0.019 0.382*** 0.075 0.172** 0.086 -0.323**
   (0.07)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.12)
Q1  0.001  0.352 -0.284 0.913 -0.190 0.118 -0.021 -1.000
   (0.42)  (0.52) (0.22) (0.60) (0.36) (0.52) (0.32) (0.82)
Q2  -0.353  -0.176 -0.070 -0.048 -0.325 -0.120 -0.043 -1.215**
   (0.31)  (0.43) (0.11) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.19) (0.46)
Q3  0.168  1.248** -0.164 1.471** -0.056 0.820 0.085 -1.181
   (0.41)  (0.56) (0.17) (0.63) (0.32) (0.58) (0.28) (0.75)
Constant  51.265  84.233 3.224 144.390*** 40.157 69.934 47.426 -98.296
   (44.11)  (49.65) (18.93) (47.15) (39.19) (40.23) (30.21) (60.69)
               
RMSE  0.04  0.06 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07
Obs.  33  33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1  
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO aggregate and disaggregated import data. The pair of numbers 
given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 





   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf.  SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  5.826***  4.034*** 7.549*** 1.291 6.148***  2.637** 9.291*** 4.135*
   (0.88)  (1.13) (0.95) (1.04) (0.88)  (1.01) (1.28) (2.37)
REER  -0.904***  -1.329*** -0.848*** -0.732*** -0.915***  -0.598** -0.579* -5.676***
   (0.23)  (0.26) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25)  (0.23) (0.32) (0.60)
CRgrw  -0.176  0.016 -0.154 0.077 -0.234  0.178 -0.167 -0.924
   (0.39)  (0.51) (0.44) (0.40) (0.43)  (0.46) (0.55) (0.96)
d.NER  -0.614  2.675 -2.368 0.993 -0.726  3.650* -6.008** -5.795*
   (1.58)  (2.35) (1.64) (1.92) (1.62)  (1.93) (2.25) (3.24)
WTO  -0.662***  -0.681*** -0.663*** -0.290** -0.653***  -0.085 -0.453*** 1.504***
   (0.10)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11)  (0.12) (0.17) (0.32)
WTO*Trend  0.025***  0.024*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.025***  0.004 0.021*** -0.022*
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend  -0.007  0.006 -0.019** 0.009 -0.007  -0.001 -0.019* 0.121***
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Q1  -0.211***  -0.188*** -0.216*** -0.227*** -0.207***  -0.184*** -0.204*** -0.084
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Q2  -0.080***  -0.032 -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.077***  -0.033 -0.103*** 0.004
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Q3  -0.027  -0.009 -0.017 -0.127*** -0.017  0.016 -0.024 0.102*
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant  14.269***  15.417*** 13.391*** 11.747*** 14.144***  12.548*** 11.572*** 29.104***
   (1.07)  (1.20) (1.00) (1.10) (1.12)  (1.09) (1.50) (2.73)
    
RMSE  0.06  0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06  0.07 0.07 0.17
Obs.  64  64 63 64 64  62 62 62
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1  1, 2  1, 1  1, 1   1, 1  1, 1  1, 1 
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the aggregate and disaggregated export data. The pair of numbers given in the 
row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS 





   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  -3.017*  1.320 -2.695*** -8.810*** -1.154 -4.087* -2.033* 2.327
   (1.50)  (2.42) (0.75) (2.58) (1.34) (2.23) (0.95) (3.39)
REER  0.762  -1.041 2.001*** 0.205 0.121 0.981* 1.520 7.439***
   (1.11)  (1.38) (0.56) (0.47) (1.00) (0.47) (1.12) (1.81)
Export  0.700  -1.023 1.788*** -0.329 0.596 0.273 1.281** 2.359***
   (0.62)  (0.77) (0.26) (0.84) (0.51) (0.54) (0.49) (0.41)
d.NER  0.120  1.608 -1.226 0.405 -0.886 2.561 -1.325 2.259
   (1.86)  (3.92) (0.77) (2.78) (1.13) (2.48) (1.51) (2.76)
WTO  -0.296  -0.003 -0.575** -0.618 -0.361 -0.731 -0.521 -4.114***
   (0.41)  (0.73) (0.26) (0.74) (0.36) (0.64) (0.42) (1.35)
WTO*Trend  0.006  -0.015 0.021** 0.000 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.158***
   (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Trend  0.085**  0.077 0.016 0.303*** 0.037 0.129** 0.026 -0.261**
   (0.03)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11)
Q1  -0.044  0.192 -0.212 0.792 -0.203 -0.134 -0.033 -0.940
   (0.46)  (0.49) (0.21) (0.72) (0.41) (0.54) (0.35) (0.82)
Q2  -0.416  -0.400 -0.070 -0.252 -0.409 -0.310 -0.121 -1.042**
   (0.29)  (0.39) (0.10) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.15) (0.42)
Q3  0.019  0.764 -0.113 1.183 -0.169 0.425 -0.055 -1.058
   (0.39)  (0.52) (0.16) (0.81) (0.33) (0.63) (0.28) (0.75)
Constant  23.468**  15.545 3.182 79.896*** 13.039* 34.955** 5.812 -63.511**
   (9.08)  (15.48) (5.84) (25.71) (7.10) (12.09) (10.97) (28.85)
  
RMSE  0.04  0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07
Obs.  33  33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1  
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO aggregate and disaggregated import data. The pair of numbers 
given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 





   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf.  SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  5.981***  5.028*** 7.386*** 2.429** 6.250***  4.382*** 7.981*** 3.414*
   (0.78)  (0.88) (0.98) (0.97) (0.78)  (0.81) (1.19) (1.96)
REER  -0.877***  -1.301*** -0.839*** -0.655*** -0.891***  -0.484* -0.611* -5.653***
   (0.23)  (0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25)  (0.25) (0.36) (0.59)
CRgrw  -0.129  -0.036 -0.043 0.128 -0.186  0.116 0.061 -0.660
   (0.38)  (0.54) (0.46) (0.37) (0.43)  (0.48) (0.62) (1.01)
Reform  -0.043  -0.028 -0.064 -0.109** -0.040  -0.070* -0.077 -0.140
   (0.04)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.10)
WTO  -0.722***  -0.816*** -0.721*** -0.524*** -0.705***  -0.333*** -0.403* 1.429***
   (0.12)  (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.13)  (0.09) (0.21) (0.33)
WTO*Trend  0.027***  0.029*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.026***  0.012*** 0.018*** -0.021*
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend  -0.008  -0.002 -0.017** 0.000 -0.007  -0.015** -0.007 0.128***
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Q1  -0.213***  -0.186*** -0.221*** -0.230*** -0.210***  -0.181*** -0.217*** -0.099*
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Q2  -0.082***  -0.034 -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.079***  -0.036 -0.107*** -0.004
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Q3  -0.027  -0.006 -0.017 -0.123*** -0.017  0.023 -0.030 0.098*
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant  14.135***  15.287*** 13.328*** 11.371*** 14.022***  12.005*** 11.697*** 28.958***
   (1.07)  (1.23) (1.00) (1.05) (1.12)  (1.19) (1.68) (2.69)
    
RMSE  0.06  0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06  0.07 0.08 0.17
Obs.  64  64 63 64 64  62 62 62
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1  1, 2  1, 1  1, 1   1, 1  1, 1  1, 1 
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the aggregate and disaggregated export data. The pair of numbers given in the 
row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS 






   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  -3.687**  1.392 -3.269*** -8.716*** -1.830 -2.266 -2.918*** 3.054
   (1.48)  (2.08) (0.81) (2.44) (1.37) (2.32) (0.84) (2.77)
REER  1.275  -0.802 2.250*** 0.228 0.423 0.863 2.220** 6.677***
   (1.02)  (0.93) (0.56) (0.48) (0.99) (0.50) (0.95) (2.15)
Export  0.932  -0.950* 1.906*** -0.300 0.739 -0.124 1.572*** 2.207***
   (0.58)  (0.49) (0.26) (0.80) (0.51) (0.55) (0.43) (0.50)
Reform  -0.069**  -0.152*** -0.037* 0.003 -0.046* -0.092** -0.072** -0.026
   (0.03)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
WTO  0.092***  0.080** 0.026 0.300*** 0.047** 0.099* 0.034 -0.257*
   (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12)
WTO*Trend  -0.308  0.179 -0.576** -0.617 -0.301 -0.836 -0.604 -3.816**
   (0.31)  (0.51) (0.25) (0.73) (0.28) (0.55) (0.38) (1.50)
Trend  0.006  -0.023 0.021** 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.146**
   (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
Q1  -0.122  0.075 -0.321 0.805 -0.294 0.128 -0.188 -0.907
   (0.44)  (0.42) (0.21) (0.72) (0.41) (0.49) (0.35) (0.85)
Q2  -0.465*  -0.505* -0.090 -0.256 -0.425* -0.203 -0.152 -1.080**
   (0.24)  (0.26) (0.10) (0.27) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.41)
Q3  -0.117  0.605 -0.229 1.189 -0.295 0.701 -0.250 -0.937
   (0.39)  (0.42) (0.17) (0.80) (0.34) (0.48) (0.29) (0.73)
Constant  23.714***  13.122 5.302 78.795*** 15.351** 25.195* 6.425 -64.419*
   (6.17)  (10.14) (5.87) (23.97) (5.82) (12.07) (8.32) (30.22)
  
RMSE  0.04  0.05 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08
Obs.  33  33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1  
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO aggregate and disaggregated import data. The pair of numbers 
given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 





   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf.  SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  5.759***  4.333*** 7.012*** 1.681* 6.049***  3.630*** 8.339*** 2.095
   (0.84)  (1.08) (0.89) (1.00) (0.84)  (0.86) (1.21) (1.97)
REER  -0.913***  -1.305*** -0.865*** -0.743*** -0.924***  -0.599*** -0.634** -5.662***
   (0.23)  (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24)  (0.22) (0.31) (0.59)
CRgrw  -0.164  -0.050 -0.096 0.046 -0.220  0.076 -0.018 -0.761
   (0.38)  (0.48) (0.43) (0.39) (0.43)  (0.46) (0.55) (0.96)
CTOT  0.161  -4.844 3.039 -2.192 0.316  -4.890* 7.217** 6.451
   (2.22)  (2.90) (2.04) (2.52) (2.32)  (2.49) (2.99) (3.98)
WTO  -0.654***  -0.559*** -0.717*** -0.244 -0.649***  -0.012 -0.577*** 1.458***
   (0.14)  (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)  (0.15) (0.19) (0.35)
WTO*Trend  0.025***  0.021*** 0.026*** 0.011** 0.024***  0.003 0.023*** -0.023**
   (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Trend  -0.006  0.004 -0.015* 0.006 -0.006  -0.008 -0.011 0.137***
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Q1  -0.213***  -0.194*** -0.214*** -0.233*** -0.210***  -0.193*** -0.202*** -0.075
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Q2  -0.079***  -0.039 -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.076***  -0.044 -0.090*** 0.024
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Q3  -0.028  -0.015 -0.014 -0.130*** -0.017  0.011 -0.019 0.107*
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant  14.149***  20.176*** 10.407*** 14.010*** 13.868***  17.482*** 4.569 22.523***
   (2.63)  (3.50) (2.38) (2.84) (2.72)  (3.01) (3.59) (4.65)
    
RMSE  0.06  0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06  0.07 0.07 0.17
Obs.  62  62 61 62 62  60 60 60
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1  1, 2  1, 1  1, 1   1, 1  1, 1  1, 1 
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the aggregate and disaggregated export data. The pair of numbers given in the 
row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS 





   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  -6.977  0.484 -2.656* -8.341*** -5.114 -4.628* -2.233 4.620**
   (4.05)  (6.28) (1.27) (1.50) (2.97) (2.50) (2.07) (1.73)
REER  4.274  -0.219 2.228** 0.452 3.280 1.295** 2.274 6.298***
   (2.99)  (3.33) (0.93) (0.46) (2.24) (0.55) (2.08) (1.52)
Export  2.461  -0.365 1.986*** -0.243 2.043* 1.225** 1.680* 2.066***
   (1.49)  (2.08) (0.36) (0.55) (1.08) (0.40) (0.81) (0.35)
CTOT  8.247  0.211 1.413 -1.262 8.560 -1.316 2.442 4.973
   (7.31)  (10.58) (2.13) (4.08) (5.26) (6.36) (4.44) (5.56)
WTO  -6.302  -3.768 -1.435 -6.695*** -4.515 -7.301*** -2.392 -8.896***
   (4.36)  (6.07) (1.48) (1.20) (3.64) (1.95) (2.75) (2.47)
WTO*Trend  0.207  0.111 0.051 0.199*** 0.149 0.234*** 0.082 0.306***
   (0.15)  (0.21) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Trend  0.088*  0.058 0.004 0.283*** 0.057 0.119* 0.006 -0.286***
   (0.04)  (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Q1  0.441  0.573 -0.352 1.764** 0.128 0.673 -0.109 -0.572
   (0.62)  (0.78) (0.37) (0.61) (0.46) (0.69) (0.56) (0.82)
Q2  -0.489  -0.388 -0.090 -0.139 -0.468* 0.020 -0.142 -1.103**
   (0.30)  (0.48) (0.11) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.16) (0.48)
Q3  0.691  1.278 -0.136 2.257*** 0.313 1.263* -0.001 0.202
   (0.71)  (0.87) (0.32) (0.49) (0.56) (0.67) (0.52) (0.78)
Constant  9.666  11.066 -1.637 75.216*** 4.286 28.751** -2.780 -78.689***
   (11.64)  (12.97) (6.97) (17.47) (9.84) (11.42) (15.24) (20.38)
  
RMSE  0.05  0.08 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06
Obs.  30  30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Leads-lags  1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1   1, 1  
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO aggregate and disaggregated import data. The pair of numbers 
given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 
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GDP  1.433*** 1.502*** 5.648***
   (0.51) (0.52) (0.61)
REER  -1.575*** -1.584*** -0.906***
   (0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
CRgrw  0.300 -0.159
   (0.51) (0.38)
WTO  -0.642***
   (0.08)
WTO*Trend  0.024***
   (0.00)
Trend  0.040*** 0.040*** -0.005
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Q1  -0.213*** -0.212*** -0.211***
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Q2  -0.081*** -0.075** -0.080***
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Q3  -0.021 -0.017 -0.028
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Constant  17.153*** 17.175*** 14.277***
   (0.77) (0.80) (1.06)
  
RSME  0.08 0.08 0.06
Obs.  63 63 64
Leads-lags  1, 2 1, 2 1, 1
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the aggregate export data. The 
pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of 
lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust 
errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, **, *” indicate the 1%, 5%, and 








GDP  3.184** -3.005** 
   (1.51) (1.14) 
REER  -2.034*** 1.111** 
   (0.29) (0.48) 
Export  0.980*** 
   (0.17) 
Trend  -0.033 0.068*** 
   (0.04) (0.02) 
Q1  -0.129 -0.132 
   (0.50) (0.42) 
Q2  0.144 -0.415* 
   (0.18) (0.23) 
Q3  0.371 -0.095 
   (0.39) (0.34) 
Constant  -4.163 18.640** 
   (11.45) (6.51) 
  
RMSE  0.06 0.04 
Obs.  33 33 
Leads-lags  1, 1 1, 1, 1 
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO aggregate 
import data. The pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads 
and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS 
regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, **, *” 




[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6]
   Ordinary  Ordinary Ordinary Processing Processing  Processing
GDP  0.422  0.478 4.809*** 3.592*** 3.640***  6.878***
   (0.78)  (0.81) (0.73) (0.61) (0.61)  (0.77)
REER  -1.864***  -1.869*** -1.319*** -1.199*** -1.203***  -0.875***
   (0.25)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)  (0.23)
CRgrw  0.226 -0.055 0.195  -0.084
   (0.62) (0.53) (0.55)  (0.44)
WTO  -0.764*** -0.598***
   (0.10) (0.13)
WTO*Trend  0.027*** 0.022***
   (0.00) (0.00)
Trend  0.047***  0.047*** 0.000 0.024*** 0.024***  -0.014*
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)
Q1  -0.176***  -0.175*** -0.185*** -0.226*** -0.225***  -0.218***
   (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)
Q2  -0.036  -0.031 -0.033 -0.117*** -0.113***  -0.111***
   (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)
Q3  0.003  0.006 -0.006 -0.041 -0.038  -0.018
   (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)
Constant  17.660***  17.671*** 15.380*** 14.786*** 14.795***  13.510***
   (1.17)  (1.19) (1.17) (1.03) (1.05)  (1.03)
  
RMSE  0.11  0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08  0.06
Obs.  64  64 64 64 64  63
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1  1, 2
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the ordinary and processing 
export data. The pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads 
and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS 
regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, **, *” 







[1]  [2] [3]  [4]
   Ordinary  Ordinary Processing  Processing
GDP  2.960  -0.101 3.591***  -2.259**
   (2.02)  (2.37) (1.13)  (0.80)
REER  -0.962**  0.376 -3.101***  0.787*
   (0.41)  (0.89) (0.26)  (0.45)
Export  0.255 1.264***
   (0.33) (0.14)
Trend  -0.026  0.033 -0.051*  0.033**
   (0.05)  (0.05) (0.03)  (0.02)
Q1  0.040  -0.318 -0.447  -0.222
   (0.68)  (0.61) (0.41)  (0.19)
Q2  0.173  -0.661* 0.060  0.013
   (0.27)  (0.36) (0.16)  (0.11)
Q3  0.603  0.206 0.055  -0.064
   (0.54)  (0.69) (0.37)  (0.14)
Constant  -8.300  7.128 -2.950  10.998**
   (15.31)  (13.20) (8.58)  (3.88)
  
RMSE  0.09  0.07 0.06  0.02
Obs.  33  33 33  33
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1, 1 1, 1  1, 1, 1 
 Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO ordinary and 
processing import data. The pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the 
number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 
dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  




[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6]
   Primary  Primary Primary Manuf. Manuf.  Manuf.
GDP  -0.603  -0.518 1.579* 2.151*** 2.183***  5.938***
   (0.44)  (0.47) (0.80) (0.63) (0.64)  (0.61)
REER  -1.143***  -1.152*** -0.728*** -1.492*** -1.496***  -0.918***
   (0.18)  (0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22)  (0.24)
CRgrw  0.343 0.050 0.130  -0.214
   (0.44) (0.38) (0.55)  (0.42)
WTO  -0.321*** -0.631***
   (0.12) (0.09)
WTO*Trend  0.014*** 0.024***
   (0.00) (0.00)
Trend  0.032***  0.032*** 0.007 0.038*** 0.037***  -0.005
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)
Q1  -0.224***  -0.222*** -0.226*** -0.201*** -0.200***  -0.208***
   (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)
Q2  -0.116***  -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.077** -0.075**  -0.077***
   (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02)
Q3  -0.126***  -0.122*** -0.126*** -0.010 -0.008  -0.018
   (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.02)
Constant  13.535***  13.551*** 11.733*** 16.589*** 16.596***  14.155***
   (0.83)  (0.85) (1.07) (0.99) (1.02)  (1.11)
  
RMSE  0.08  0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09  0.06
Obs.  64  64 64 64 64  64
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1  1, 1
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with export data on primary and 
manufactured goods. The pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number 
of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in the 
dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  





[1]  [2] [3] [4]
   Primary  Primary Manuf. Manuf.
GDP  3.933  -0.746 2.889** -1.057
   (2.74)  (1.69) (1.08) (0.99)
REER  -2.210***  -0.349 -2.102*** -0.001
   (0.44)  (0.57) (0.24) (0.44)
Export  1.431* 0.600***
   (0.71) (0.15)
Trend  -0.032  0.041 -0.031 0.033
   (0.07)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Q1  0.042  -0.322 -0.273 -0.262
   (0.84)  (0.77) (0.42) (0.37)
Q2  0.227  -0.302 0.054 -0.367*
   (0.35)  (0.30) (0.14) (0.20)
Q3  0.896  0.090 0.085 -0.227
   (0.74)  (0.74) (0.32) (0.28)
Constant  -11.119  4.361 -1.615 12.830**
   (20.83)  (13.35) (8.24) (5.45)
  
RMSE  0.11  0.09 0.05 0.03
Obs.  33  33 33 33
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1
 Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO import data on 
primary and manufactured goods. The pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are 
the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced cointegrated variables used in 
the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  






[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8] [9] 
   SOE  SOE SOE FIE FIE  FIE Priv. Priv. Priv. 
GDP  2.384***  2.444*** 3.813*** 5.060*** 5.176***  7.355*** 7.155*** 7.465*** 2.268 
   (0.57)  (0.60) (0.74) (0.72) (0.75)  (0.84) (1.26) (1.28) (1.66) 
REER  -0.815***  -0.822*** -0.541** -1.304*** -1.317***  -0.673* -7.518*** -7.555*** -5.768*** 
   (0.20)  (0.21) (0.23) (0.28) (0.28)  (0.37) (0.55) (0.56) (0.58) 
CRgrw  0.252 0.071 0.486  0.010 1.295 -0.753 
   (0.47) (0.48) (0.64)  (0.61) (1.84) (0.99) 
WTO  -0.203** -0.260* 1.691*** 
   (0.10) (0.13) (0.27) 
WTO*Trend  0.008*** 0.014*** -0.029*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Trend  0.005  0.005 -0.010* 0.025*** 0.024***  -0.002 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.136*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Q1  -0.178***  -0.177*** -0.178*** -0.215*** -0.213***  -0.214*** -0.129 -0.123 -0.094 
   (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Q2  -0.037  -0.032 -0.033 -0.111*** -0.102***  -0.103*** -0.009 0.017 0.003 
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) 
Q3  0.020  0.024 0.021 -0.035 -0.028  -0.032 0.030 0.049 0.094 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
Constant  13.488***  13.505*** 12.284*** 14.803*** 14.836***  12.005*** 37.754*** 37.841*** 29.521*** 
   (0.95)  (0.98) (1.10) (1.34) (1.32)  (1.70) (2.56) (2.60) (2.64) 
  
RMSE  0.07  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.26 0.26 0.17 
Obs.  62  62 62 62 62  62 62 62 62 
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1  1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the post-WTO data on exports via SOEs, FIEs, and private firms. The 
pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced 
cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, 
**, *” indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 44 
 
Table 8: Imports of SOE, FIE, and Private firms, normalized by the Hong Kong re‐export to China unit value index 
[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
   SOE  SOE FIE FIE Priv. Priv.
GDP  4.032*  -4.032* 3.412** -1.760* 0.403 -2.779
   (2.19)  (1.95) (1.31) (0.96) (1.66) (2.51)
REER  -0.947**  0.976** -2.730*** 0.640 -3.096*** -0.056
   (0.38)  (0.42) (0.25) (0.55) (0.49) (1.25)
Export  0.969** 0.952** 0.589**
   (0.36) (0.15) (0.24)
Trend  -0.067  0.111** -0.037 0.039* 0.079* 0.099*
   (0.05)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Q1  -0.093  -0.486 -0.266 -0.069 0.461 -0.206
   (0.66)  (0.53) (0.42) (0.28) (0.82) (1.20)
Q2  0.211  -0.444* 0.091 -0.044 0.024 -0.889
   (0.26)  (0.22) (0.16) (0.13) (0.33) (0.56)
Q3  0.591  0.114 0.189 -0.030 0.735 -0.046
   (0.51)  (0.56) (0.35) (0.21) (0.75) (0.90)
Constant  -16.858  27.559** -3.221 11.255* 19.164 25.239
   (16.46)  (11.04) (10.00) (5.36) (13.20) (15.53)
  
RMSE  0.08   0.05  0.06  0.03  0.11  0.10 
Obs.  33  33 33 33 33 33
Leads-lags  1, 1  1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1, 1
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the post-WTO data on imports via SOEs, FIEs, and private firms. The 
pair of numbers given in the row labeled “Leads-lags” are the number of leads and the number of lags of the first-differenced 
cointegrated variables used in the dynamic OLS regression.  Robust errors are in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates.  “***, 




[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
Consumption  0.847**  1.304 0.436 -0.925* -0.109 0.275 1.333* -1.298
   (0.40)  (0.79) (0.32) (0.45) (0.16) (0.61) (0.72) (0.90)
Fixed asset inv.  0.836*  1.663** 1.186*** 1.054** -0.214 1.438* 1.488** 2.149**
   (0.47)  (0.74) (0.41) (0.40) (0.20) (0.78) (0.67) (1.00)
REER  -1.561***  -0.647 0.665 1.814* -1.501*** 1.177 -0.660 7.155***
   (0.52)  (1.54) (0.56) (1.01) (0.34) (0.78) (0.52) (1.33)
Export  0.348**  -0.360 1.077*** 0.898* 0.174 0.312 0.823*** 1.676***
   (0.16)  (0.31) (0.11) (0.50) (0.11) (0.24) (0.13) (0.18)
WTO  0.366  1.857** 0.525** 0.330 0.215 1.548*** 0.450 -3.363***
   (0.31)  (0.69) (0.22) (0.36) (0.17) (0.51) (0.31) (1.05)
WTO*Trend  -0.012  -0.053*** -0.016** -0.012 -0.003 -0.043*** -0.017 0.093***
   (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Trend  0.026***  0.077*** -0.024*** 0.014 0.039*** 0.026** -0.006 -0.240***
   (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Q1  0.042  -0.001 0.105 0.271 0.036 -0.030 0.220* -0.008
   (0.21)  (0.26) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.27)
Q2  -0.081  0.212 0.090 0.213 0.055 0.043 0.140 0.099
   (0.15)  (0.23) (0.14) (0.18) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15) (0.24)
Q3  0.031  0.198 0.098 0.460*** 0.138* 0.148 0.268* 0.474
   (0.11)  (0.21) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.16) (0.14) (0.33)
Constant  15.245***  17.576** -1.831 -6.828 14.377*** 2.781 7.559*** -29.946***
   (3.30)  (7.24) (2.90) (7.71) (2.19) (4.08) (2.55) (7.29)
               
RMSE  0.05  0.08 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08
Obs.  59  59 59 59 65 59 57 59
Leads-lags  1, 4, 1, 1  1, 2, 4, 1 1, 4, 1, 3 1, 1, 2, 4 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 2, 3, 1 2, 4, 1, 2 1, 1, 1, 2





[1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
   Aggregate  Ordinary Proc. Primary Manuf. SOE FIE Priv.
GDP  4.099  1.563 4.648 6.723 1.701 -0.504 3.834 11.581**
   (2.39)  (8.31) (2.62) (3.98) (1.45) (2.84) (2.21) (4.47)
REER  2.785**  0.586 0.884 4.973** 1.320** 2.530*** 1.518 5.535***
   (1.13)  (1.07) (1.21) (1.86) (0.58) (0.64) (1.01) (1.24)
Export  1.472***  1.820** 0.857** 1.822** 1.323*** 1.760*** 1.137*** 1.262***
   (0.36)  (0.65) (0.37) (0.59) (0.18) (0.37) (0.26) (0.17)
Prod  -6.744**  -2.091 -4.812* -12.606*** -3.021** -5.637*** -4.472** -12.651***
   (2.28)  (5.05) (2.42) (3.53) (1.09) (1.58) (1.99) (2.57)
Trend  -0.009  0.010 -0.032 0.012 -0.013 0.113** -0.027 -0.106
   (0.03)  (0.12) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
gfc08  -0.849  34.195 -1.195 1.446 8.153 7.133 8.584 67.008*
   (28.70)  (50.23) (28.94) (45.72) (12.87) (16.85) (19.45) (31.10)
gfc08*REER  -0.008  -8.217 0.221 -0.929 -2.101 -3.168 -1.635 -12.582*
   (5.45)  (9.38) (5.38) (9.47) (2.44) (3.53) (3.66) (5.98)
gfc08*Export  0.083  0.416 0.026 0.246 0.156 0.639** -0.050 -0.519
   (0.43)  (0.62) (0.48) (0.45) (0.24) (0.25) (0.39) (0.52)
Q1  0.091  -0.372 0.133 -0.175 0.038 -0.122 0.111 -0.468
   (0.39)  (0.65) (0.43) (0.63) (0.21) (0.41) (0.36) (0.74)
Q2  -0.308  -0.166 -0.261 -0.329 -0.025 -0.152 0.049 -0.463
   (0.31)  (0.36) (0.29) (0.70) (0.09) (0.25) (0.16) (0.77)
Q3  0.063  -0.103 0.098 0.149 0.077 0.284 0.094 -0.725
   (0.36)  (0.75) (0.41) (0.57) (0.20) (0.41) (0.32) (0.92)
Constant  -76.17**  -29.88 -56.59 -133.24** -34.37* -41.10 -55.02* -163.95***
   (29.96)  (83.65) (32.39) (43.30) (16.14) (25.30) (28.69) (43.07)
               
RMSE  0.04  0.09 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07
Obs.  35  35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Leads-lags  1, 1, 1, 1  1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1
Note:  The table reports the results of estimating equation (2) with a relative productivity variable and the Great Recession dummy and its 
interactions. The one lead and one lag DOLS specification.47 
 
 
Figure 1: The Log real value of RMB (left scale) and Chinese trade balance, in billions 
USD per month (right scale) 
 
 






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Exports by customs classification (Billion USD) 
 
 



























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Exports by product type (Billion USD) 
 
 


























































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Exports by firm type (Billion USD) 
 
 






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Shares of exports, by firm type  
 
 
Figure 10: Shares of imports, by firm type 
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